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THE LEVELLER INFLUENCE IN THE NEW NODEL ARNY
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1647 TO 1649

G. Elaine Johnson
Senior Thesis
January 15, 1964

PREFACE
Although the scope of this paper, from February of 1647 to
January of 1649, would seem rather limited, the actual impact of
Leveller principles and methods was felt during this short span of
time.

After the final Agreement of the People in early 1649, the

movement seemed to center around personal attacks, reiteration of
previous ideas, and defensive measures.

The establishment of the

Commonwealth, under the thumb of Oliver Cromwell, left behind all
the Leveller plans of government, which had been discussed and
approved by the Agitators and the Army Council.
Other aspects of the Leveller movement, such as their concept
of religious toleration, could have received greater attention, but it
was not felt necessary to the sense of the paper.

Likewise, the

political situation and intrigues of the period could have been
covered in a more thorough manner, but only the events pertinent to
the Army-Leveller relationship were explained in detail.
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Personifying the ideals of the Levellers, John Lilburne probably
dominated the comment and activity of the party over the extent of his
actual importance. 1 By combining the emotional state of a religious
zealot with the philosopher's appeal to reason, Lilburne always attracted
attention.

For with a maniac's disregard for his personal welfare, Lil-

burne fought for liberty and justice and became the fiery heart of the
movement.

While this popular idol did become a threat to the Presby-

terian Parliament and to Oliver Cromwell, nevertheless, his reported
defiance of all authority, his egotism, and his vindictiveness caused a
just historian of the Levellers to state that Lilburne "sacrificed
public causes to personal resentment. 112 United with Lilburne in this
fight were a group of well-educated men of middle or merchant class
origins.

Uncolorful and retiring, William Walwyn, often abused for his

lack of religious convictions, was accused of everything from blasphemy
to murder.3

These two men along with Wildman, the spokesman for the

party at the

Army Council

debates, Overton, a signer and promoter of

various petitions and pamphlets, Sexby, Rainsborough, and a few other
supporters from the Army and London comprised the Leveller leadership.
Too idealistic and progressive to be practical, the Levellers

p. 6.

1Theodore Calvin Pease, The Leveller Movement (Washington, 1916),

2c. H. Firth, "John Lilburne," The Dictiona:g of National Biography, XI, 1129.
3c. H. Firth, ''Willia•·n Walwyn," The Dictionary of National ~
graphy, XX, 741.
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could demonstrate the source of their principles and demands to be from
legal theories and from the growing tradition of "religious populism. 11 4
Religious separation and dissent meant individuality rode rampant, as
men found that the right to seek truth in the scripture led to the
privilege of questioning authority and to a new respect for the rights
of men.5

Out of Independency came these important intellectual princi-

ples:

first, the priesthood and equality of believers and second, the
liberty of free inquiry. 6 Utilizing the experience of the Protestant
dissent, the Levellers had the skills, channels of communication, and
organization to change ideas into action.
With the Bible in one hand and Coke's Institutes in the other,
Lilburne equated legal theories with the religious concepts of separatism.7 Yet while his ideals were concerned with the preservation of the
common, fundamental law, many Levellers wished to discount precedence
and to move in turn to a political philosophy of reason and natural
rights.

Therefore, this step in theory led the Levellers beyond the

redress of grievances, even beyond the return to Anglo-Saxon laws before
the hated Norman Conquest, to the claim for the sovereignty of the
people and "the pursuit of rights because they ought to exist.n8 Con-

V Lwilliam Haller,
V' 'Ibid., p. 268.

The Rise of Puritanism (New York, 1937), p. 260.

~ 6G. P. Gooch, English Democratic Ideas in ~· Seventeenth Century
(New York, 1959), p. 8.
v/?christopher Hill, Puritanism and Revolution (London, 1962), p. 28.

~bid.,

p. 75.
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sequently, i f any institution or ruling body was not completely representative, it forfeited its sovereignty, and the people had no compulsian to obey.

Raising a contest over representation and franchise, the

Levellers pleaded for those natural rights in opposition to the rights
of property, upheld by law and the army leaders.
Finding themselves leaders of an opposition aroup, the political
malcontents worked to win support for their system and party, which soon
acquired a popular appellation.

Usually used derogatorily, the term

Leveller, which at first was denied by the group, was applied by writers
with various interpretations.

In July 1647, Cromwell was forced to move

against the Presbyterian Party, and the King had refused

the~~-

posals.
~ At this tiJne [there wa~.7 a new faction grown up in the anny
••• called Levellers; who spoke indolently and confidently
against the King and Parliament and the great officers of the
army, • • • and declared that all degree of men should be
levelled, and an equality should be established, both in title
and estate throughout the kingdom.9

Though the party was prominent in the

Ar~

before the Putney debates at

the end of October, it was there that the term Leveller was given to a
follower of Lilburne and did finally win acceptance by the party. 10 In
a confusion of names, for there were 11 other sorts of men, going then

9Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, quoted in Wilbur Cortez Abbott,
ed., The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, 1599-1649 (Cambridge,

1937)-;l, 493.

-

-

-

-

10william Haller and Godfrey Davies, eds., The Leveller Tracts,
1647-1653 (New York, 1944), p. 1.

under the name of Levellers, 1111 the actual party could be distinguished
from other republicans or religious reformers, by its image as a certain
group of radicals gathered around Lilburne.

11John Lilburne, "Legall Fu.ndamentall Liberties, 11 Haller and
Davies, etds., Leveller Tracts, p. 424.

CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOR1ENT OF PROTEST AGAINST PARLIAMENT

Political philosophies and political reformers are rarely created
in a political vacuum; the proper solution of happenings and personalities, accompanied by a catalyst of one disturbing event is usually necessary to transform a group of radicals into a formidable party.

There-

fore,we see that not until the actions of Parliament against the Army
had brought on the necessity of petitions, did the Leveller
form and blend its program with that of the army agitation.

part~

take

For with

the defeat of Charles .I, the soldiers of the New Model Army had expected Parliament to settle the nation without the abuses and oppressions
of tyranny.

Harboring no thoughts

~f

disloyalty, the soldiers would

have followed the dictates of their officers in quiet obedience but for
the cool disregard of Parliament for the welfare and payment of its Army.
Direct interference in politics was forced upon the Ar.my by the Presbyterian Party, who felt themselves losing ground under threats of Independency and Royalism.

With the country in great debt, with an old

tradition of civil law, and with the danger of a well-disciplined military force of Independents, Parliament quickly planned to disband the
Army.

On

February 18, 1647, the plan to reduce the infantry was intro-

duced in the House; a plan whereby the cavalry would be left dependent
on a weak, undisciplined group of trained-bands or civilian soldiers.
Since the defense of Ireland now fell on Parliament, many of the soldiers

7
were to be impressed or enlisted for service. 12

Of the 1,000 horse

soldiers, 400 were to be dismissed, and 14,000 foot soldiers were to be
sent to garrisons.

A serious mistake was to deprive any member of Par-

liament~his commission in the Army. 13 To further divide the troops, the
Houses discussed sending 8,000 of the infantry, 3,000 of the horse, and
1,200 dragoons to Ireland. 1 4 ~ile the plan for disbandment was insult
enough to the victorious Army, the attempts to oust Fairfax and the
attack on Cromwell in March left the Army .with a homogeneity of resentment.
In spite of dissatisfaction among the rank and file over disbanding, strong encouragement from their officers, particularly Cromwell,
would probably have brought the loyal well-disciplined soldiers to obey
the dictates of Parliament and the wishes of the nation.

Expressing

this confidence, Cromwell stated," 1'1 know the army will disband and lay
down their arms at your door, whenever you will command them. ,'J..5 However
as further encroachment on their rights, the soldiers were offered only
a promise of payment of their arrears for a short time)with the rest in
debentures.

With the assessments not strictly collected and the accounts

~12 samuel R. Gardiner, Histo;y of the Great Civil War, 1642-1649
(London, lts93), III, 217-18.
--03J. R. Tanner, English Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century, 1600-1689 (Cambridge, 1957), p. iLl.
l4Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers,
Venetian Series (London, 1927), XXVII, 309.
15Gardiner, History,

m,

222.
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ill-kept and seldom paid, the possibilities of collecting the arrears of
18 weeks for the foot and 43 for the horse and dragoons were slim. 16 As
a result of Parliament's failure to pay the soldiers and officers, the
Anny spoke out in the tradition of
Commons.

Englishmen'~

through a petition to

With due respect, the mild, unpolitical list of economic de-

mands was presented through their

general~-Fairfax.

The Humble Petition

of the Officers and Souldiers, on March 21, 1647, requested redress of
these grievances:

an act of indemnity, their arrears, no impressment to

foreign lands, pensions for widows and orphans, and money to meet expenses.17 Much to the despair of the soldiers, the officers refused to
hear their complaints and supported the act of disbandment.

"And lest

mere suspicion of their compliance with the Army • • • should be turned
to their prejudices, they were willing ••• to suppress the soldiers
first most innocent and modest petition.n18
·..~~ rWhen: the army officers refused the leadership of their men,

direct action became necessary.

In a meeting with the Commissions of

Parliament at Saffron Walden, March 21, the officers' request for volunteers for Ireland was met by a rebuttal of demands.
sary on four issues:

A reply was neces-

arrears, payment, service, and command in Ireland. 19

~6 Tanner, Constitutional Conflicts, p. 141.
v((7Gardiner, History, III, 225.
18 John vlildman, Putney Projects, quoted in Abbott, ed., \'l'ritings
and Speeches, I, 437.
19Abbott, ed., Writings and Speeches, I, 435.
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Following this meeting, Lilburne attacked Cromwell for his betrayal to
the Army and his stand for obedience to Parliament.

nr am informed •

• •

that you and your agents • • • will not suffer them to petition till
they have laid down their arms whensoever they shall command them. • • •
Accursed be the day that ever the House of Commons bribed you with a vote
of 2,500

f

to betray and destroy us. 1120 While a formal protest was

still iri the making and the Leveller party unsupported, the irrepressible Lilburne expressed his feeling against the mighty Cromwell.
Having made no effort to meet the demands of the Army, Parliament
gave up its one chance for disbandment or alliance with that powerful
group.

To create a single grievance, behind which all dissenting par-

ties could unite, was assuredly a suicidal course of action.

To carry

this course further on the road to destruction, the Commons passed an
extreme resolution, introduced on March 30 by the hated Denzil Ho.lles,
that

11

All those who shall continue in their distempered condition • • •

shall be proceeded against as enemies of the State. 1121

Cromwell was not

only deprived of his commission by an earlier declaration, but was now
threatened with imprisonment. 22
had to accept the leadership of

There was no longer a choice; Cromwell
th~

Ar.my and fight for their demands.

By alienating not only the soldiersJbut also the leading parliamentary

20John Lilburne, Jonah's f!l, quoted in Abbott, ed., \'lritings ~
Speeches, I, 435.
21Abbott, ed., Writings and Speeches, I, 437.
22 Ibid.
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allies from the Army, the Commons sealed ·itEr.· fate.

For men accused of

sedition or treason now took thought to an organized resistance and
entrance into the political arena.
. same month of Marc h , which saw an open b reac hbetween
.
I n thl.S
. .t'arb.ament and the Anny, the radical group of Levellers also presented a petition to Parliament.
tion of

~

Very different in content and tone, the Large Peti-

Levellers was attacked and burned by the common hangman.

Such action was in direct violation to the right of petition, but the
list of grievances which the party presented did amount to a political
manifesto or statement of constitutional reform.

Unimproved by the war

for justice, certain oppressions still disturbed the nation's defenders
of liberty.

Among the issues were illegal monopolies, religious con-

formity, tithes, imprisonment without due process, the negative voices
of the King and Lords, forced oaths and self-witness, complicated and
foreign law procedure, and imprisonment for debt. 23 More under the
influence of Lilburne than other Levellers, the plea concentrated on the
legality and precedence of rights.
declaration of party doctrines.

Most importantly, it was the initial

With no drastic change ·proposed i.n the

structure or sovereignty of government, the petition was only a small
measure of later declarations and pleas, which were founded on the philosophical concept of natural rights.
Lilburne 1 s early influence also extended into the rank and file

~;A.

pp. )ltl-321.

s.

P. Woodhouse, ed.,

Puritanism~ Liberty

(London, 1950),

11
of the soldiers, whose discontent with the Commons was uniting them in a
strong determination not to yield.
If

Relating the greedy desires of the

Godly party 11 or Presbyterians, the anonymous pamphlet !:;

New-~

Stratagem, from the radicals in the Army, was inspired by Lilburne. 24
.By April, army manifestoes were filled with ideas of the extremists, and
the A:rmy ,was said to be "one Lilburne throughout. 112 5 From writing to
demonstration, the orderly petition and rumbling pamphlet led to a show
of unity.

When the Commissioners visited on Saffron Walden on April 15

to appease the soldiers and to recruit volunteers to Ireland, they were
met by a mighty cry, " ':Alll

Alll

Fairfax and Cromwell and we all go 111f 6

Worried about the exclusion of those officers from command, the soldiers
were willing to follow them into service.

On this same day, April 15,

the first mention was made of representation from the troops in the form
of two Agitators from each regiment.

Feelinihf!e Council of '\iar, com-

posed of officers,w~ack in presenting the views of the Army, they
wanted to present them directly. 27 Any such concept of organization
with secret agentsand codes and representation of the common soldiers
surely came from an infiltration of Leveller ideas.

~4aardiner, History, III, 235.
25Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 3.

~26Gardiner, History, III, 234.

V'27Ibid., p. 237.

CHAPTER III
THE INFLUENCE OF THE LEVELLERS IN THE OIDANIZATION
AND ACTIVITY OF THE AGITATORS
Perhaps more than any other act:iDn.of theLevellers, the method,
organization, and doctrines of agitation which the soldiers utilized
was the greatest debt owed by the Army to that secular, democratic
party.

1ihile furthering the cause of the soldiers, the Levellers

i~

proved their own status of recognition, which enabled them to become a
formidable threat in later months. 28 Though many historians characteristically disagree on the total impact and long-range influence of the
Levellers, most do agree on this one point.

The party inserted some of

its principles and techniques into the Army through the Agitators and
the Army Council.

"Inevitably, the Levellers took an important part,

though one that cannot be precisely described, in supporting, even in
helping to direct, the campaign of resistance which began forthwith. 112 9
With this dangerous new element, a group committed to satisfaction of
demands and the Leveller ideas of equality and justice, present in the
Army, concessions were too late.

Even a resolution passed by the Com-

mons on April 27 to pay six weeks' arrears to disbanded men who didn't
go to Ireland was taken lightly.3°

I/2Bwoodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty,

IJ.J.7.

29Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 9.
30Abbott, ed., Writings~ Speeches, I, 439.
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After the decision to organize was made, small gifts from Parliament couldn't stop the movement.

In a letter to the generals on April

28, 1647, the agents or Agitators, elected from eight regiments of horse,
discussed the choosing of and meeting with two representatives from
every regiment in the Army.

By refusing to respond, the Grandees demon-

strated that they themselves had no idea of organizing the rank and file
for resistance.

Cromwell, Ireton, and Fairfax had certainly not given

up hopes of a vindication from Parliament or even of the restoration of
a slightly limited monarchy.

On

April 30, the officers sent a letter to

Commons requesting that their reputations be cleared.

With indignation

and yet with a growing fear of overthrow, the members offered promises
of arrears, debentures, and indemnities.

In reply, the generals in-

structed their officers to take notice of the news from the Commons on
the payment of arrears and indemnities and to make a report "concerning
the present temper and disposition of the regiment.n3l Nevertheless,
with the month of May came both the reluctant recognition of the Agitators by the officers and the election of representatives from the
In contrast to the hopes of the officers,
the Agitators were steadily growing in strength. 32
infantry as well as the horse.

With such progress being made, fears that the Levellers would
push the Army into more serious discontent and uprising caused the

3~etter from Cromwell, Ireton, and Skippon to Colonels or chief
officers of the respective regiments, May 3, 1647, quoted in Abbott,
ed., Writings and Speeches, I, 441.
2Gardiner, History, III, 244-49.

v/.3
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Grandees to make a surface alliance with the Agitators.33

Due to this

uneasiness, 223 commissioned officers published the Declaration of the
Army on May 15,34 in an attempt to discourage soldiers from entering the

political arena on the advice of the radicals.

Reaching to the heart of

their uniform dissatisfaction with Parliament, the officers complained
of arrest without the consent of Fairfax, suggested definite amounts of
arrears to be paid, asked permission to publish vindication, and confirmed the right of troops to petition their officers.35 Impressed by
their demands, Cromwell defended the Declaration to Parliament on May 21.
With some intent on compromise, Parliament passed an ordinance on May 25,
1647, stating that army accounts were "to be audited and cast up during
their services in the said Army: • • • and to give out Debenters accordingly unto the said (l;fficers and Souldiers.•r36 Yet two problems remained:

first, the Army could not be convinced to disband short of

redress of all grievances, and second, the accounts and assessments were
never properly handled and completed.
The necessity of compromise and redress of grievances was grudgingly but finally admitted by Cromwell and Ireton.

Therefore they were

V33Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, p. 175.
3Lr.ray 15, 1647, is the date given by Abbott, but May 16, 1647, is
quoted by Gardiner. On the basis of preference to primary source and
due to the specific mention of a meeting at Saffron Walden on May 15, I
have used this as the date of the document.
35Abbott, ed., \iritings and Speeches, I, 444-45.
36c. H. Firth and R. s. Rait, eds., Acts and Ordinances of the
Interregnum, 1642-1660 (London, 1911), I, 9~ - --

15
anxious to maintain discipline and to prevent any possibility of extremism or anarchy.

Careful guidance and dominance over the Agitators was

better assured by bringing them into a carefully chosen Council of the
Army, consisting of all the general officers, two commissioned officers
and two enlisted men or Agitators from each regiment.37

By combining

the Council of War and the group of Leveller-inspired Agents, the officers could out-number the radical reformers.

In actuality, the greatest

influence of the Agitators existed outside the Council, where the spokesmen for the soldiers could utilize the press and an organized procedure
of petitioning in the manner of the Levellers.

~le

the officers con-

centrated on quieting the economic and immediate demands of the Army,
the Agitators involved themselves in politics to seek justice in the
settlement of the kingdam.3 8 In a circular to the soldiers on May 19,
the .Agitators stressed unity by saying, W![f you do but stand ••• nor
do anything without the consent of the whole anny, you will do good to
yourselves, your officers, and the whole kingdoml-~9
Outside of this infiltration into the Army, the Levellers' procedure of protest, from the Large Petition in March to the organized
protest in the Army in May, consisted of two more petitions to the Commons.

By recognizing the Commons as

the supreme authority,n40 the

111

37c. H. Firth, Cromwell's Army (London, 1902), p. 353.

0~foodhouse, ed. Puritanism and Liberty,
V39Gardiner, History, III, 254.

V

40
Ibid., p.

255.

(J.y.
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March petition had stepped too far in the direction of a radical manifesto, such as those typical of the autumns of 1647 and 1648.

Since it

appeared as an encroachment on the privilege of the influential classes,
and since the petition's demands had a chance of military support, the
Commons was particularly anxious to be rid of the Army and to suppress
the petition.

Two disciples of Lilburne were immediately imprisoned, an

action which brought forth a second petition the next

day~_March

20.

As

a culmination to the March petition, the Levellers sent a third plea on
May 20 to the Commons to demand the liberation of the imprisoned supporters.41

The order to burn this petition was the signal for the complete

absorption of the Leveller program into the Army protest.h2 From Hay to
the end of the Army Council debates at Putney early in November, Leveller
ideas could be found almost solely in the pronouncements from the Army.
Communication transpired from the Levellers to the Agitators, and then to
the people.

Only when the leaders of the party found the army officers

untrustworthy and in opposition to some of the Leveller doctrines did
they publish outside the name of the Army.

~41Ibid.,
1'')

'~Haller

pp.

255-5B.

and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV
THE ARMY ENGAGE21ENTS Al'ID ProPOSALS FOR THE
SET~ffiNT

OF THE KINGDOM

Despite the petitions, the explosive temper of the Army, and the
election of Agitators, Parliament, fearing an Army plot against the
King, determined to proceed with disbandment beginning June 1, 1647. In
order to prevent a united effort of disobedience, separate rendezvous
were assigned for the final muster to disband or to send troops to Ireland.

Yet resistance did occur, and Ireton properly expressed a dread

of the consequences. 43 As

he.· had dreaded, a strong defiance was pro-

posed in the form of a general rendezvous at Newmarket.

Commissioners

from Parliament were recalled, and the two forces were in open conflict.
In spite of all evidence of the break, Ireton believed the Army to be
still loyal if only the Houses would reform.

Indicating that neither he

nor Cromwell had led this movement, he wrote to the latter, "I assure
you that passionate and violent counsel which is given thus to provoke
the .army will in time be apprehended to be destructive, or my observation fails me. n44
Yet reform and satisfaction from the Commons was not in the realm
of possibility, for there was a formula of Leveller machinery plus the
spirit of resistancelpouring from the one source of domestic military

v 43Gardiner,
\/44rbid.

History, III, 261.

18
might, which was the magic solution needed to weaken the Houses beyond
repair.

Indicating their secondary position, Parliament voted to hold

the most violent Leveller petition, that of June 2, for consideration in
committee.

Cooperation of the party with the Agitators was hereby re-

vealed in the demands of the petition, which called for the redress of
grievances in the Army.

The vote on June 3 to consider the payment of

full arrears and to strike off the resolution calling the soldiers
enemies of the state was another show of weakness.

Such reform would

have at least hampered the efforts of the Levellers in the Army.

In

desperation the Presbyterians invited the Scots to invade England
against the New Model.L5 If the rendezvous at Newmarket was the Army's
sign of revolt, Parliament's invitation placed the soldiers as enemies
of the kingdom.
In the position of a political force, the Army had to quickly

draw up a declaration of its intentions.
of distempered soldiers, the

Army

Thrown into a mass gathering

Council, especially the Agitators, had

to work to achieve unity and order.

By placing all future decisions of

disbandment or any actions to be taken in the hands of the Council, the
troops felt they had a slight voice in their future.

If the

Army

Coun-

cil did nothing else, it at least preserved discipline and pacified the
soldiers in times of crisis.

A shaky but acceptable agreement was

reached at Newmarket on June 5, when the Solemn Engagement was signed.
It was decided to allow the Council to decide when the condition of full

L5Abbott, ed., Writings~ Speeches, I, L51.
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redress was met and it was safe to disband.

Until that time, all regi-

ments were to remain disobedient to the legislative orders.46 With the
signing of this statement, the change in the Arrrry revealed that the
soldiers had been led from petitioning as humble subjects into the
machinery and tone of a revolutionary party.

In the opinion of the rank

and file, they were not "a mere mercinary Arrrry, hired to serve any
Arbitrary power of a State; but called • • • to the defense of our owne
and the peoples just rights, and liberties.n47 Though the practical
aspects of the Engagement came from Cromwell, and though the Army Council was dominated by the officers, the nature of such a document was the
evidence of Leveller influence on the Agitators.48 An even stronger
indication of the radical infiltration was the following of party lines
on the state of nature.

By

defying the demands of the people, Parlia-

ment had relinquished its sovereignty and had placed each man left to
his own authority.

Mutual agreement and unity in the Army now had be-

come necessary for reason and safety. 49 The Grandees were anxious to be
lawful and traditional in their task of settling the kingdom; the Levellers were determined to give all men a voice in their welfare and in
governing the country.5°

V46woodhouse, ed., Purltanism and Liberty, /J.i/-!J.Jil.
47Henry Ireton, "A Declaration, or Representation, 11 Haller and
Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 55.

0

8aardiner, History, Ill, 2eo •.
49Pease, Leveller Movement, p. ll55 •
.50ibid., p. 179.
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In a more definite statement of democratic ideals and fundamental
rights, the Army laid out its program for securing the kingdom.
Declaration,~

!

Representation, printed June 14, 1647, was composed by

Ireton, but expressed the opinions of the more radical rank and file.
To clarify their position on disbandment, to state their grievances, and
to

soot~e

the suspicions of the nation was the expressed purpose of the

Declaration.

Since Parliament had obviously intended to break or divide

the Army, and since no reasonable answer was given to

i,

its· requests,

the Army felt justified in -.:; its disobedience and desires for the future
security of the people.

Those things necessar.1 "to the same ends, of

common right, freedom, peace and safetyu5l distinguished this document
from earlier petitions of the Army.

Dealing with Parliament, the Decla-

ration urged the purging of unjust members, set a date for dismissal,
and ordered new elections on a more representative distribution of seats.
Along with the usual demand for payment and the confirmation of the
right of petition, this publication showed its colors as a political
manifesto by claiming the right of religious differences within the
establishment.

J.ltlilitary grievances were put in the background in pre-

ference to constitutional principles.

Convinced that they were expres-

sing the desires of the people, the Army's spokesman included the statement

of assurance, "as we have already found the concurrent sence of
2
the people in divers counties by their Petitions to the Generall."5 As

51 Henry Ireton, "A Declaration, or Representation," Haller and
Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 62.
52Ibid., p. 63.
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one in a series with the Houses, begun March, 1647, and continued
through the summer and fall, the Army Declaration was an important milestone on the way to Army dominance.53
Not satisfied with ·the document alone, the radicals also pushed
for a march against London.

Army leaders, however, were very conscious of

the people's fear of military dictatorship
and were extremely hesitant.
I
Despite the officers' claims for peace, their letter of warning to city
authorities presented the first real threat of force.54 The impatience
of the soldiers, in contrast to the cautious legality of the officers,
was doubtless due to radical insistence of the Leveller influence.

Con-

vinced of his mission to lead the Army, Lilburne declared himself to
Cromwell on July 1, 1647.

Seeing that the Commons 11rmuld not heare,

regard, or receive, but burnt, or sleighted all those just Petitions;
••• I applyed my selfe vigorously unto the honest blades, the private
Souldiers, I meane, of the Army.n55
To hold back the energetic Lilburne and to pacify the restless
soldiers led by the Agitators, the officers called a Council of War at
Reading to consider the march.
place in the

Immediately the Agitators demanded a

debate~,

and the Council of War, composed only of officers,
56
became the Army Council on July 16, 1647.
Army secretary John Rushworth

53Ibid., pp. 51-63.
54Abbott, ed., vlritings ~ Speeches, I, 459-460.
55Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 9.
56Abbott, ed., 1-Tritings ~ Speeches, I, 473-475.

wrote in a newsletter,
tor~

should be

souldiers.u57

11

It is not more than necessary they {.the Agita-

~admitteS7

considering the influence they have upon the

A significant turning point and a concession to the dis-

sident party in the Army, the inclusion of the Agitators in the Reading
debates proved that the Leveller-minded group had become essential in
the actions of the New Model.
the Agitators were:

Among the five points insisted upon by

first, the exclusion and impeachment of eleven

delinquent members, second, the return of the London militia into loyal
hands, and third, the release of certain prisoners, particularly John
Lilburne.

With the adverse party in command in London, a march was

necessary to enforce their points and to show the effectiveness of the
Army.5B Though the Agitators "prest with reason and earnestness,n59
the officers didn't feel that the situation was serious enough to warrant a show of force.
dangerous.

Exclusive power in the militia could have been

In the conclusion of the debate over a march, the Agitators

and the officers were able to reach a basic agreement on all the proposals, but Cromwell felt that the means they advocated was improper.

Only

when the good of the nation could be served in no other way was the use
of military might wise.

Therefore, it was desirable to consider first

"what it is that we intend to do with that power when we have it. 1160 To

'

~·'

7

p. 475.

0Bwoodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty:, PP• 409....410,
59Abbott, ed., Writings and Speeches, I, 475.
0<'wocdhouse, ed. , Puritanism and Liberty, p.

411.
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follow up the challenge of power, the Council began to debate on the
then uncompleted Heads of Proposal.
Fairly well satisfied with the debate and in deference to their
officers, the Agitators gave in on the question of a march and began to
debate on July 17 the proposed Heads.

As an Agent, Allen expressed the

feeling of inadequacy of the common soldier as a politician, for he saw
that "we are most of us but young statesmen. n61 From this simple admission, Allen gave a clue into one of the underlying reasons for the strong
Leveller influence in the Army and particularly among the rank and file.
The common soldier, who had no rights of franchise and minimum experience
in government, was easily attracted to the party that would identif,y
itself with the lowly men of the kingdom and would fight for their economic welfare.

Knowing their inexperience, Lilburne was dedicated to

the cause of arousing people to their lost liberties.

On

the other hand,

neither the political opportunist Cromwell, nor the cold man of reason
Ireton, nor the "old, beaten, subtle foxes of Westminster1162 could be
unreservedly swayed by the appeal of the Levellers.

Realizing this fact,

their leader continually warned the Agitators to be steadfast, to be
watchful for deceptions qy the Grandees, and not to be fooled by the
63
apparent willingness of the officers to work with them.

~lrbid.,

p. 421.

v6'2Richard Overton, quoted in Y.Toodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, p. 334.
63Pease, The Leveller Movement, P• 126.
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As a follow-up to previous declarations and as an assurance to
the nation, the Heads of Proposals, completed August 1, 1647, was a sensible summary of the proposed settlement of the kingdom.

Handled com-

pletely by the Grandees, the fifteen Heads and five supplementary articles took no thought for the fundamental rights of the people, but intended an agreement with Parliament and the King.

Though it did provide

for the King's privileges and responsibilities, including the right to
call or dissolve a Parliament, it also included a few provisions for
legal rights, soldiers' grievances, and the right to petition. 64 The
fact that such things were included indicates that Ireton found it
necessary to heed the Levellers on certain issues.

Ireton's sincerity

in the debates revealed that he was not just an opportunist like Cromwell, but was slightly sympathetic to the notion of reform.

While the

radicals were thoroughly democratic and individualistic in principle,
the moderate officer was dependent on legality and the authority of the
state. 65 Feeling that the officers had made too many concessions, particularly in granting the negative voice to the King and Lords, the Levellers showed their dissatisfaction.

"I know no other use of these Pro-

posals than to support the tottering reputation of the grand officers in
the minds of such as shall not discern their vanity. 1166 By all evidence
then and in the chain of events still to follow, the author of the statement in Putney Projects has some justification for his condemnation.

64aardiner, ed., "Heads of Proposals," Constitutional Documents,
pp. 316-319.
v05woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, p. 98.

~6John Wildman, P~tneh Projects, quoted in Woodhouse, ed., ~
tanism ~Liberty, pp. 27- 28.

CHAPI'ER V

THE PRESENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE CASE OF THE ARMit
IN THE PUTNEY DEBATES
Political agitation by the Levellers, both inside and outside the
Army

in the autumn of 1647, was concerned with the growing distrust of

the Grandees.

Though great strides had been made in their influence,

the party leaders were discontented with the results of the engagements
and the declarations, the dominance of Cromwell and Ireton in the Army
Council, and the misuse of the Agitators.

During the summer of 1647 Lil-

burne began to be suspicious of the Independents.

Even though Cromwell

had acted on the previous proposal to purge the Parliament of eleven
delinquent members, yet his frequent visits and negotiations with the
King caused the Leveller to regard him as a hypocrite. 67 These two men,
who fought for, with, and against each other at various times in their
careers, met curiously on September 6 in the Tower where Lilburne was
imprisoned.

Cromwell, who carne to him hoping that he could be won over

to the side of the Independents, found instead that ~itb~rn~ regarded
him as an enemy and could conceive of no political compromise.

In re-

turn for his release, Lilburne promised to leave the country i f justice
and liberty were assured.

Rightfully cautious, Cromwell feared that the
68
radical would stir up trouble in the Army if allowed to go free.

67Abbott, ed., Writings~ Speeches, I, 496-497.

vr6aGardiner,

History, III, 363.
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Though only a small incident, this meeting exemplified the feeling which
existed between the two leaders of opposing parties.

The Lieutenant-

General discerned the formidable threat levelled against his Army by
Lilburne the fanatic, who regarded the personal ambition and machinations of Cromwell with contempt.

After September 14, the .wily Grandee

supported a motion in the Commons to find precedence for the Lords to
act against the prisoner, who then appealed to the soldiers to rise up
'

against the "perfidious firebrand.u 69 All through the month of September, Cromwell and Ireton continued to work for a settlement with Charles,
who could provide a status of legality for the Army and its leaders.

As

this possibility became more remote in October, the anti-monarchial
feeling grew, and the soldiers felt dissatisfied to the point of further
action.
Uncertainty in the political situation and a distempered feeling
within the Army bred an even greater opportunity for the extremist.
Since all powers, the King, Parliament, and the Army, had failed to
bring peace, the Levellers wanted to do away with all existing forms of
government and to build a new system on abstract principles.

Regardless

of attempts to pacif.r the soldiers, the Grandees were unable to stifle
the forceful program of the movement.7° Finding a number of Agitators
unfaithful and too passive in representing the soldiers, five regiments
of horse elected IINew Agents."7l More under the influence of Lilburne,

69Abbott, ed., Writings~ Speeches, I, 505.
"J(oGardiner, History, III, 380.
71Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 357.
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the new Agitators met to draw up a proposal for settlement on the principles of certain rights and liberties.
The

~of

Completed on October 9, 1647,

the Armie, written by John Wildman, was presented to Fairfax

on October 18.

Heartily disapproving of the Heads of Proposals and

afraid that the officers were betraying the Declaration of June 14, the
rank and file wished to present a true statement of their ideas and
demands.

They felt that there had been 11 a total neglect of insisting

positively upon the redress;· of those grievances or granting those desires of the Army as Soldiers. u72 In addition to restating the same
economic and political oppressions that had existed since the beginning
of the Parliament versus Army struggle, the Case brought in more fundamental principles of government.
Not unwilling to consider the restoration of the King, they
demanded beforehand the security of the people's rights.

With this aim

always in mind, they desired the immediate purging of Parliament, dissolution within a year, a biennial meeting and election, a new system of
constituencies, and representatives chosen by manhood suffrage.

Mainly

-

interested that the Case should become supreme law, the Levellers and
Agitators defined the abstractions on which their theories were based.
Original power existed in the body of the people, therefore, the truly
representative form of government was the only just one.

11

/JoiJ

the

equitie of popular safettie is the thing which justifieth all formes, or

72 John \1/ildman, "The Case of the Army, 11 Haller and Davies, ed.,
Leveller Tracts, p. 69.-
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the change of formes for the accomplishment thereof; and no formes are
lawfull longer then they preserve or accomplish the same.u73 Government
exists for the good and safety of the people. 74 Yet two basic Leveller
ideals which the Army leaders found difficult or impossible to accept
were the equality in a voting system and the idea that the aim of government was the protection of the people's rights.

That the two groups

could never be reconciled on these issues, regardless of their political
situation or interaction, was set in clear relief against the background
of the Putney debates.
On October 28, 1647, the Army Council was gathered at Putney to

discuss and to pass judgment on the

~,

but before a solution was

found to the proposals, a new document was presented by the Agitators.
Holding to the concept that all authority of government originated from
the people, the Levellers felt it was desirable to draw up a written
constitution, which would be the supreme law after acceptance by the
nation.

~

Agreement of

~

People of October 2tl did not replace the

Case, but it was formulated more as a definite statement of fundamental
law, rather than as an explanation of Army action and grievances.75 All
power, with the exception of certain rights specifically reserved for
the kingdom's populace, was placed in a more representative, biennial
Parliament.

For the first time in Army declarations, there appeared a

73Ibid. J p. 78.
74rbid., pp. 64-87.

~5Gardiner, History, III, 382-383.
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list of the just rights the Levellers had been claiming for the people.
Such basic things as freedom of conscience, equality under the law, and
no impressment were revolutionar,y concepts to most of the nation.7 6
More than any other statement, the conclusion of the Agreement revealed
the ideals and intentions of the Levellers and their allies, the Agitators, in the fall of 1647.
These things we declare to be our native rights, ••• and resolved to maintain them with our utmost possibilities against
all opposition whatsoever; • • • having long expected and dearly
earned the establishment of the certain rules of government, are
yet made to defend for the settlement of our peace and freedom
upon him that intended our bondag~ ••• 77
Accounts of the debates, which lasted from October 28 to November

8, were not complete in their coverage by the writers.

Nevertheless

they revealed the procedure of the Council of the Army, the beliefs of
the spokesmen for each party, and the basic differences which existed
between the Grandees and the Levellers.

For the Agitators, the debates

presented the true test of their strengths and abilities in putting
across the real needs and ideas of the rank and file.

Therefore, much

thought was given to the presentation of the Agreement, and the debaters for the party stood firm in their arguments.

Never was the ulti-

mate control of Cromwell and Ireton seriously threatened, but the Agents
and the Levellers persistently sought and gradually won acceptance for
some of their principles.

Even after the Putney debates were completed

[Ab"Agreement of the People," Gardiner, Historz, III, 392-394.

vn~.,

p. 394.
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and the Agitators became a powerless group, the Grandees were left with
a few democratic ideas imprinted on them.

Weaknesses within the group

of agitation were soon apparent in the form of inexperience in the task
of political debate. With Sexby and Allen from the Agitators, and John
Wildman, a civilian, speaking for the New Agents, the group was further
strengthened by the radical spirit of Colonel Rainsborough and a few
other inferior officers.7 8 Overton warned them of the dangerous designs
and intended dominance of the higher officers.
to be

ca~tious

11 •

••

I only advise you

and wary, and keep up your betrusted power and authority,

and let nothing be acted • • • or concluded without your consent and
privity.n7 9 Always afraid of divisions in the Army, Cromwell reacted to
the Agreement with uncertainty and suspicion.

To the dissatisfaction of

the Levellers, he found the constitution too impractical and lacking

° Consequently, the complaints and concepts

general, popular approva1. 8

of the Agreement had to be carefully reviewed by the Army Council, and
a decision on its approval was postponed until after debate.
In the opening debates, the two Grandees found themselves under
great pressure to not just criticize and refuse, but to fight the Levellers with principles that could unify support on the side of Independency.81 Since their victory in the war had not yet brought justice or

78Firth, Cromwell's

Armr,

p • .358.

V79Richard Overton, "An Appeal from the Commons to the Free
People," Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, p • .3.34.

~OGardiner, History, III, .3tl2-J84.

~Ibid., P• .386.

31
peace, the kingdom demanded a settlement.

In this spirit the Agreement

was drawn up and defended in the first speech of Sexby.
cause of our misery

/J.i/ upon

two things.

"· •• The

We sought to satisfy all men,

and it was well; but in going Libou~ to do it we have dissatisfied all
men. ,B 2 vlith particular disapproval of the negotiations with Charles
and the compromises made to Parliament, the radicals were determined to
settle the state with an original form of government.

Before proceeding

with a fundamental constitution, it was first necessary to be free of
all previous engagements.

As a result, the question of

Ar~

became the first point of contention and verbal opposition.

commitments
wnile Crom-

well firmly believed that any past agreement was binding, the Agitators
argued that it was not holding if now considered unreasonable or contrary to the good of the people.

Using all manner of devices to cool

down the fervor of the extremists at the debates, Independent leaders
employed the contest over the engagement as a delaying technique to give
them time to work out a more flexible, less democratic Agreement.

After

exhausting that question, both parties proceeded to rationalize their
positions on the proposals. 83
Advocates of the document first had to demonstrate their right to
take and to hold the liberties which they desired.

Dogmatic and slight-

ly irrational, the Levellers insisted that their authority was derived
from the natural rights of men.

i/§Zwoodhouse, ed.,

Any past law or agreement which was

Puritanism~ Liberty,

p. 2.
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contrar,y to the people's will was unacceptable.

In rebuttal, the offi-

cers asked for proof that natural rights had ever existed and if so,
that they had taken the specific form outlined in the radicals' plan of
government.

As a veteran political thinker, Ireton was able to maneuver

the questions to put the Agitators on the defensive and to move the
debate around to the center of his political theories.

Inevitably, the

problem of suffrage was brought up in the discussion and thereby became
the most heated point of contention.

Again referring to natural rights,

the Levellers demanded manhood suffrage, because .they believed any man
bound by the law must have a voice in its making.

In contrast, Ireton

contended that the control of the state was limited to those who had a
stake in the nation or, in other words, who possessed property.

He was

also afraid that equal rights would lead to the concept of equal property. In spite of Ireton's argument, the soldiers' spokesmen continued
to press the point by asking what liberties did belong to those who had
risked their lives for the safety of the nation.

Only the privilege of

living free from tyranny was the reward of the common trooper with no
property. 84 Continuing on the problem of suffrage, Rainsborough conceded that property could be estates "butt I deny that {the franchis.!?
is a propertie to a Lord, to a Gentleman, to any man more then another
in the Kingdom of England. 118 5 As a concession to the request for the
vote, Cromwell, who also wished to add provisions for the rule of the

84Pease, Leveller Movement, pp. 215-220.
85rbid., p. 220.
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King and a Council of State, proposed a franchise to be extended only to
those-common men who had served the Army. 86 With such a fir.m conviction
in the equality of men and the sovereignty of the people, it was impossible for the democrats to accept any compromise.

As Sexby expressed

it, the political motivation of the soldiers seemed to rest on the issue
of suffrage.
~we have engaged ••• and ventured our lives and it was all
for this; to restore our birthrights and privileges as Englishmen, ••• But it seems now except a man have a fixed estate in
this kingdom he hath no right in this kingdom. I wonder we were
so much deceived.87

Enigmatically, the Putney debates portrayed the gro-vling difference between Independency and the Left, but, at the same time, they
revealed a certain unifonnity of goals.

'When two parties of such bit-

ter opposition were thrown together in a verbal contest over a way of
life and a system of government, the atmosphere of tension made even
minor

ar~ents

unlikely and brought out tactics of debate which further

complicated the situation.

~fuile

the Grandees were not too far from the

ideals of the Levellers, they were violently opposed to their arguments.
Both groups saw the necessity of unity, but their means of accomplishing
it were different. 88 Unity to the officers was obedience to their wishes
on the settlement, but to the radical party, it was consent to government by the people.

Both Ireton and Lilburne believed in the supremacy

\/B6Gardiner, Histozx, III, 39();...391.
87Firth, Cromwell's Army, P• 359.
tfiBwoodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty,
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of the law, but the Levellers used law to limit government and to proteet the people's rights and liberties, while the Independents viewed
law as a protector of property. 89
Besides the personalities, the issues, and the

argumen~which

were unfolded at Putney, the significance of these debates lay in the
open confrontation of the two parties.

In pamphlets, letters, and peti-

tions, only one side of the contest was seen at a time; the result was
that each group presented their doctrines without direct challenge.
Consequently, as the Agitators grew in prominence and influence over the

Army, the superior officers were forced to include them in a discussion
of any proposed settlement and theories to prove the irrationality and
improbability of the Leveller plan.

With superior tactics of debate,

Cromwell and Ireton defeated the radicals in rationality by standing on
the legality of compacts and property rights.

Yet the emotional, sin-

cere appeal and persistence of the Agitators remained undaunted, for
they then decided to plead the case of the Agreement directly to the
soldiers in a general rendezvous.9° Insisting that the nation be ruled
by an unalterable constitution and not by changeable laws, the Levellers
urged the soldiers and the people to join in the Agreement to decide the
extent of Parliament.91

"And were but this agreement established,

89Pease, Leveller 11ovement, p. 221.
9°Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 3S9.
0lntetters to the Free-Born People of England," quoted in Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Libertz, pp. 445-446.
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doubtless all the grievances of the Army and people would be redressed
.

~mrne

d"~a t e1y • • • • u92

Inevitably discipline and authority did prevail, and Cromwell
enforced the strict rules of war and obedience, as necessary for survival.
Trying to pull the Army out of politics, he maintained that the Houses
should be left to decide lfwhat is fit for the kingdom.n93

The people

should only be watchful to see that the Commons was properly representative.

Impressed by the forces and influence of the Agitators and by the

danger of the principle of manhood suffrage, Cromwell resolved to send
the agents and officers back to their regiments to quiet the dissatisfaction among the rank and file and to await the rendezvous.

On Novem-

ber 8, the indomitable Independent carried the vote at the final meeting,
and the Army Council was dissolved.94 Discipline was restored at the
cost of representation, and thereafter, the actions of the Army were
decided by the General and the Council of \iar.

Fairfax, 'l'lho later

claimed that the declarations and petitions from the Army had received
his signature without his approval,95 had threatened to resign his command unless the agitation was ended.

While the Army Council had been

t/92"Letter to the Officers and Soldiers," quoted in Woodhouse, ed.,
Puritanism and Liberty, W• 44B- 449.
91irth, Cromwell's Arrrry, p. 360.
\;94u A Letter from Sev= Agitators to their Regiments, 11 quoted in
Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, pp. 454-455.
95Lord General, Sir Thomas Fairfax, quoted in C. H. Firth, ed.,
Stuart Tracts, 1603-1693 (Westminister, 1903), p. 363.
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successful in calming the voices of discontent and in weathering the
storm of disunity, begun in March of 1647, the body 1A':-1tad.:mly as long as
the different voices and opinions did not become loud and persistent.
Its partial success meant the death of the Council, for the persuasive
declarations and defenses of the Agitatovs could not be tolerated.
Despite later attempts at revival, the Council and Agitators were lost
as organs of propaganda for the Leveller doctrines.96
When the promised rendezvous did take place, the regiments found
themselves divided in three locations, and therefore, they were unable
to seriously challenge the imposed quiet and discipline.

Despite the

apparent defeat of the Levellers in the Army, on November

15

two regi-

ments were incited to rebel and appeared with copies of the Ajreement.
Quickly and

harshly~the

disturbance was put do\in by Cromwell, who had

the ringleader of the New Agents shot.

After the incident, a general

reconciliation of opposing parties was enacted, as the Independents
formed a temporary and unsteady alliance with the Levellers '• 97 Conciliatory action continued through November to January of 1645, during which
time Leveller prisoners were released and some agreement was arranged
with Parliament.

On

January 3, a vote in the Commons for no more acl-

dresses to the King was heartily approved by Cromwell, who had moved to
the Left's position on the issue of restoration.

Unity had been

96Firth,
Cromwell's ~, p. 362.
/
[;frrloodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, [Jcjf.
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obtained by the efforts of the Lieutenant-General according to his
methods and not by the desired Agreement, but the Independents had to
move even further left in the course of events through 164tl. 98

CF.APTER VI
DIRECT AT'rACKS ON THE GRA.l'IDEES M1J THE SEVERAL AGREEMENTS

As the kingdom became again involved in civil strife by the
escape of Charles to the Isle of Wight, the Leveller influence was
curbed. With the exception of a few personal petitions, declarations,
and defenses, the party of the Left was completely out of the political
scene.

Called to the bar and imprisoned in February for promoting a

seditious pamphlet, Lilburne and Wildman demanded that the Commons
either claim sole authority and redress grievances or else declare that
'it ."Was.·· unable to relieve the people.

In a varied list of social,

political, and economic grievances, it was obvious that the Levellers
had withdrawn from the Army as their channel of protest.

Though the

party returned to the earlier methods of direct petition, its.· threat
was sufficient enough that the document was burned and its authors were
put in prison.

Termed seditious and unjust, the petition was taken as

an effort to make the people disloyal to Parliamentl9 From~ Declaration
of Some Proceedings, recounting the trial of Lilburne in 164e, it was
seen that the group around him had gone back to the meetings, organization, and manner of protest of the early days of 1647.

Yet their come-

back on the political stage did not really occur until the end of the
war and with the publication of Walwyn's The Bloody Project, which

99"The earnest Petition of many Free-born People of the Nation,"
quoted in Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, pp. 107-118.
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merely reaffirmed the old complaints against oppression. 100
Dated August 21,

164~,

The Bloody Project repeated the constitu-

tional demands of the earlier petitions, but it also involved leaders of
the Left in a strong attack on the Grandees.

Feeling that all hope for

redress and reconciliation with Parliament was shattered, the pamphlet
saw previous abuses now replaced by new ones of equal suppression.
Army

The

had forgotten its responsibility and promises to the kingdom and to

the soldiers.

11 • • •

All the quarrell we have at this day in the King-

dome, is no other than a quarrell of Interests, and Partyes, a pulling
down of one Tyrant, to set up another, and instead of Liberty, heaping
upon our selves a greater slavery than we fought against. rr

101 Finally

the printed attack demanded that Parliament do whatever was conducive to
settling the kingdom and relieving the people.
Political agitation in the fall of
with mistrust of the Grandees

~~....

and~the

164~

was once again considered

establishment of a constitutional

scheme, but the situation in England had changed from 1647.

Now that

Charles had been completely defeated and withdrawn from the issues of
the kingdom, the question arose over the disposal of the person and the
office.l 02 Since the last civil war could be blamed only on the King,
the Levellers urged punishment for Charles and a constitution which

lOOHaller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, P• 15.
lOJ.william l<Ialwyn, "The Bloody Project," Haller and Davies, eds.,
Leveller Tracts, pp. 135-145.
102c. H. Firth, IIJohn Lilburne, 11 Dictionary~ National~

graphy, XI, 1125.
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would abolish the Lords and Monarchy.

Due to the recent violence and

hatred of the King, the petition of September 11, 164U, had more influence and support than any Leveller document of 1647. 103
Meeting at the Whalebone in London, Lilburne and other leaders
drew up The Humble Petition and presented it to Parliament with. the signatures of 40,000 people.

The significance of the pamphlet lay in the

fact that it represented the principal statement of Leveller ideals and
it became the basis of the Agreement of the People, drawn up for Army
debate in December of 1648.

Outlined in three sections, The Humble

Petition explained why the people had

s~ed

with Parliament against the

King, told what apprehensions still remained in the kingdom, and enumeraI

ted what things the people still desired.

Claiming the Commons as the

highest authority in the land, the petitioners had expected that authority to defend them and to redress their grievances.

The great fear in

the radical group was the return of monarchy, which might again embroil
the country in a conflict over supreme authority.

By the recent rising

against the people, it was obvious that the King was contemptuous of
their safety and freedom.

In a long list of constitutional provisions,

the petition told what was needed for the welfare of the people and for
the future protection of their rights.
legal and parliamentary demands such as:

Included in the enumeration were
the supreme authority of the

Commons, yearly elections, a set time of meeting and dissolution, religious freedom over civil authorities, equality under the law, trial by

~03Tanner,

Constitutional Conflicts, p. 152.

jury and not by the Lords, simpler law proceedings, law written in English, and no self-incrimination.

Economic demands included help for the

poor, the removal of the excise tax and the abolition of monopolies.

A

variety of requests, from defining the position of the Lords to paying
the Army, completed the statement of the Levellers.~0 4 After several
determining events had occurred through the autumn of 1648, the Army
leaders found it necessar,y to reach an agreement with the Left, who used
the petition of September 11 as the basic viewpoint of the party.
Necessity was usually the mother of Oliver Cromwell's political
inventions, for once again in 1648, the situation in the kingdom led him
to reverse his previous commitments.

Always true to the authority of

Parliament, he was extremely hesitant about moving against the legal
establishment.

Even though the Commons had defiantly ignored the com-

plaints of the Army and had continued with orders for disbandment, the
political commander had refused to move against London and the Legislature.

In contrast, the Cromwell of 1648 was in no position to turn away

from the responsibility of settling the peace--a job which had to be
done without the restoration of Charles I.

~lhen

Parliament resumed

negotiations with the King in October, the Army, which had just completed its second war against Charles, was thoroughly aroused.
threat could not be overlooked and the Remonstrance of the

~

Such a
was pre-

sented to the Council of Officers on November 10. It was immediately

104John Lilburne, "The Bumble Petition, 11 Haller and Davies, eds.,
Leveller Tracts, pp. 147-155.
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approved and sent on to the Commons on the ltlth of the month. 105 Besides demanding justice against those responsible for the war, the petition asked to make the sons of the present King incapable of ruling England.

With no reply from Parliament, the Army acted illegally and radi-

cally by seizing the King at Newport and marching toward London to
106
threaten the Commons.
With the Army and Parliament once again at odds, the Independents
found it expedient to work temporarily with the Left.

Ireton not only

conferred with the Levellers, but also accepted the definite influence
of Lilburne in the Remonstrance and the proposal for an Agreement.

In

return for the concessions made to the party, he accepted the idea to
end Parliament and ~9-~le by a cow~ttee until a new constitution and
.~-..-...-··
the new representatives could be approved. On November 30, the Council
_,,.,..,.J''-"''""

of Officers instructed the House to dissolve and follovred up the demand
by arriving in London on December 2, 164tl.

Still shying from the idea

~~'

the Independents decided to purge rather than to

dissolve that body.

Pride's Purge was thereby enacted on the 6th of

of a military

December. 107 Without any hint of their ambitions, the Army declaration
for the march to London stated that they desired 11 a just and safe settlement of the kingdom upon such foundations as have been propounded by:us
and others for that purpose.n108 Yet power was handed over to the
I

\1105woodhouse,

ed. , Puritanism and Liberty,

{)y.

l06Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 363.
Vfl0 7woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty,

V108Ibid.' p.

466.
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Council of Officers, who held both the authority in the Army and the
control over Parliament, where less than eighty members were left in the
Independent Rump. 109
Foreseeing the overbalance of power, the Levellers had met at
Nag's Head Tavern in N0 vernber to discuss the desired settlement.

In a

statement of their intentions, they pressed for an agreement,before the
King was executed and before Parliament was purged1 in order to keep an
equilibrium of tyranny.

Wanting security before the Grandees were left

in command, the Left requested a meeting of representatives from the
Army and from every county.

From past experience, especially at Putney,

Lilburne was afraid of delay tactics, so consequently, he pressed for an
Agreement immediately. 110

In recognition ' , a committee of sixteen,

composed of four representatives from the Army, Parliament, the Levellers, and the Independents, respectively, was appointed to discuss the
proper and just settlement of the kingdom. 111 Therefore, only a few
days after the purge, the Levellers prematurely drew up an Agreement
which forced the hand of the officers to debate the document.

With the

expressed purpose of offering the plan of government to the nation,
Lilburne published his Agreement on December 15, 1648, to give men the
"opportunity to consider the equity thereof, and offer their reasons

v/i0 9Tanner,

Constitutional Conflicts, p. 152.

\,lilOJohn Lilburne, "Legal Fundamentall Liberties," quoted in Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, pp. 342-346.
J111\-J'oodhouse,

ed~Puritanism and Liberty, /)'{! •
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against anything ••• before it be concluded..u112
When it was concluded, the plan of the radicals brought on a
fierce debate in the Council
to January 6, 1649. 113

o~

Soon in the discussion, it became apparent that

the plans for publication of the
ent interpretations.

Officers at Whitehall from December 16th

~reement

£! ~

People had two differ-

To the Grandees, it was intended as a representa-

tion for the approval of Parliament, but the Levellers aimed to distribute the constitution for subscriptions from the Council of War, from
the regiments, and from all the people. 11 4 Accounts of the several
weeks t debate further showed that Ireton, the "eyes and earsn 115 of the
Independents, was not as close to democratic thought as was first supposed by his consent to an agreement.

Despite all argument, he made

changes in the original plan, refused to allow complete liberty of conscience, and gave Parliament the right to punish without due process of

law.~n the Agreement presented to the Rump on January 20, 1649, not
only was the right to worship denied to non-Christians, Papists, and
Prelates, but also civil magistrates kept same of their former control
over religious instructions and discipline.

Detailed provisions were

v,2
ll John Lilbume,
Puritanism~

nAn Agreement of the People, 11 Woodhouse, ed. ,
Liberty, p. 355.

v' 113John

Lilburne, "A Plea for Common Right and Freedom," Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, p. 467.
\_, ll4J ohn Lilburne, "Legal Fundament all Liberties," Woodhouse,
ed., Puritanism and Libertz, pp. 348-350.
vll5Ibid., p. 347.
16
Ibid., p. 348.
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made for the distribution of parliamentary seats, but the Leveller plan
for manhood suffrage was sensibly restricted to require a man to be a
housekeeper and a wage earner.

Though supreme authority was given to

representatives in civil affairs, the Agreement did reserve certain fundamental rights for the people and planned for the executive power in a
Council of State. 117
Both the differences in handling the Agreement and the additions
made by Ireton confirmed the judgment made by a Royalist in Mercurius
Pragmaticus:

11

The grandees and the Levellers can as soon combine as

fire and water; the one aim at a pure democracy, the others at an oligarchy.n118

In contrast to the Grandee designs of rule by the minority,

which would have to be upheld by the military, the plan of the Left
would have had to be propagandized by local agents.

If the people had

been able to choose their own form of government, as the Levellers proposed, the decision probably would have been for the restoration of
monarchy.

Yet the organization and method of subscription could have

won the populace to acceptance of a petition.

Describing the system

which would present the Agreement, a hostile writer claimed the Levellers "have Agents of their own in all Quarters of the Army, the Counties abroad, and the City of London, to draw in Persons to subscribe
to the aforesaid damned particulars.nll9 Though the concept of govern-

ll?Gardiner, ed., Constitutional Documents, pp. 360-370.

~ 18 aooch, English Democratic~' p. 167.
ll9Pease, Leveller Movement, p. 236.
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ment by consent was reasonable and lawful, Cromwell could not allow any
civil action to take precedence over military pm-1er. 120 What he planned
was rule with an iron hand' and the Agreement was discussed and drawn up
only to pacify the Left until he could afford to suppress .,_.it and set
up the Commonwealth.

After the King was charged with betraying the fun-

damental laws and liberties on January 6, was tried, and at :last was
121
executed,
the Grandees were free from two powers of opposition--Parliament ar:rl the King.

With all military and civil power in the hands of

the Lieutenant-General, the only possible source of trouble was the
Leveller party, which was quickly and surely put down.
When the Grandees dropped the idea of an agreement, a petition
was drawn up from the soldiers to protest an unrepresentative Council of
Officers acting in the name of the Army.

As the first in a series of

attacks from February to fall, this protest was handled by Cromwell)who
restricted petitions from being sent to the Commons) and said that any
pleas '·10uld have to go through the military channel to the General.

As

the Leveller movement now consisted of an outside group of extremists,
their influence in the Army in a positive, constructive sense had died
with the Agreement of the People in January of 1649.

Though the appeals

to the army now managed to incite an occasional mutiny, their political
contribution bad come primarily through the Agitators and New Agents of
the Army.

When the voice and petitions of the soldiers to Parliament

120Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 34.
121Firth and Rait, eds., ~~Ordinances, I, 253.

47
had been to his advantage, Cromwell had accepted their representatives
in the debates and in an Army Council.

Suspicious and deeply resentful,

many soldiers planned to reappoint Agitators and revive the Army Council,
but the petition was termed seditious and the authors were punished. 122
Now that the cry of the rank and file was levied against its superior
officers, the Grandees called it mutiny.l23
Though the democrats·:.:;, had long pleaded for the abolition of the
negative voice from the King or Lords, the acts passed by the Rump to
abolish the kingship on Harch 11;24 and to abolish the House of Lords on
March 19;

2

5 were certainly no sign the Levellers had gotten part of

their program passed.

Executive authority now passed to the Council

of Stata., Set. up in February of 1649, it was even more tyrannical in
suppression of petitions, imprisonment of political opponents, and absolute control over the kingdom.

Censorship and other restrictions on the

rank and file caused Lilburne to say that by the nature of the Council
of State, "our Liberties have bin more deeply wounded, than since the
beginning of this Parliament; and that to the dislike of the Souldiery.'

.J-26

Violent in their condemnation of the present executive body, the Leveller

12 2Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 366.
123Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 18.
12 ~irth

and Rait, eds., Acts and Ordinances, II, ltl.

12 5rbid.' p. 24.

1 26John Lilburne, "England's New Chains Discovered," Haller and
Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 162.
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leaders blamed all the misery of the nation on the evil designs of Cramwell and Ireton, who had deceitfully tricked and lied their way to complete dominance.

By any method of obtaining power--replacing officers,

punishing political objectors, or allying with former enemies--the
Grandees had slowly proceeded to power over the last months from the
breach of promises made at Newmarket in June, 1647, to the overlooking
of the Agreement in January of 164~. 12 7
In the questioning of Lilburne, Overton, Prince 1 and Walwyn before
the Council of State in March of 1649, Cromwell expressively summarized
the whole matter of influence and interaction between the Grandees and
the Levellers.

In stating the conflict he said,

to deale with these men, but to break them • • •

1

~ou

have no other way

[OiJ they will break

you. 1112 ~ One or the other of the parties had to prevail, for their
political theories were not compatible.
Gardiner, who was sympathetic to Lilburne and his group until he
angrily attacked Cromwell, felt that the Leveller party lost all because
129
they were uncompromising and persistent in every demand.
Too revolutionary for their day, the Levellers drew their political theory from
political situations.

Suffering from injustice, they constructed a

theory to counteract the oppression. 13° Democratic in their organization

127~., p. 164.
128Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 21.
129Ibid., p. 34.
l3°Pease, Leveller Movement, p. 238.
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and their concept of government by consent, the party platform probably
would have been harmful if completely carried out, for the common man
of the day had no ideas or experience in political participation.l3l
Though there were several drawbacks and disadvantages of the democratic
group, the threat came with the mood and desires of the common soldiers,
who together comprised a mighty force in the kingdom.

From the mild

petitions for arrears, to the organization and debates of the Agitators,
to the negotiations within existing forms of government, and finally to
the Agreement for a new basis of settlement, the Levellers had made
their influence felt to this purpose,
be done to everyone:

11

for what is done to anyone, may

besides, being all members of one body, that is,

of the English Commonwealth, one man should not suffer wrongfully, but
all should be sensible, and endeavour his preservation."

13

131 Haller and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 36.
132Ibid., p.3.3.
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